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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-ADMISSIBILITY IN A FEDERAL 
COURT OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED BY STATE OFFICERS-In response to 
a call from a citizen whose suspicions had been aroused by the actions of the 
defendant and a companion, Maryland police unlawfully arrested the com-
panion and searched the premises occupied by him and the defendant. & 
a result of this search, money was found which had been stolen in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Although the search was illegal under Maryland law 
and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, this money was used as 
evidence to convict the defendant of housebreaking and larceny in the 
District of Columbia federal court. On appeal, held, conviction reversed and 
remanded for a new trial excluding such evidence. As the evidence was ob-
tained in violation of the Constitution, it should be excluded on principle 
and as a matter of sound judicial policy even though only state officers par-
ticipated in the unlawful proceedings. Hanna v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 
1958) 260 F. (2d) 723. 
At common law the admissibility of evidence at a trial was not affected 
by the illegality of the means of acquisition.1 In light of the constitutional 
protection against illegal searches and seizures, however, the federal courts 
have excluded all evidence thus obtained by federal officers.2 In Weeks v. 
United States,3 the Supreme Court stated that since the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply to the states, evidence illegally obtained by a state officer 
would be admissible in the federal courts. The Court, however, did not di-
rectly· consider whether the act involved in that case violated the Four-
teenth Amendment. In the later case of Wolf v. Colorado4 it was held that 
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure is implicit in the "concept 
of ordered liberty" and consequently is embodied in the protection afforded 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, 
the Court in Wolf further held that whether evidence obtained by an uncon-
stitutional act is admissible in state criminal proceedings is a question not 
controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment, but is for the states to decide.5 
Even after the Wolf case lower federal courts have continued to allow, on 
the authority of Weeks, the introduction of evidence illegally acquired by 
l: 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2183 (1940). 
2 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
3 Id. at 398. 
4 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See 50 CoL. L. REv. 364 (1950), for a good discussion of this ·case: 
.5 But see the dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge in that 
case,. where it is argued that such evidence should -be excluded from state criminal 
proceedings. 
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state officers.6 In reaching a contrary conclusion the court in the principal 
case stated that Wolf had overruled the idea upon which the Weeks decision 
had predicated the allowance of state-seized evidence-the idea that such 
state action is not unconstitutional-and that therefore Weeks is no longer 
controlling authority.7 The court's reasoning, however, seems erroneous. 
Weeks stated only that such actions by state officers did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, and the effect of Wolf was merely to extend through 
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment the unconstitutionality of illegal 
searches and seizures to state action. This extension did not affect the ulti-
mate question whether the Fourth Amendment requires exclusion of evi-
dence which, though illegally seized, was not obtained in violation of 
that amendment. 
Whether the holding of the principal case is sound may depend on how 
the federal rule which excludes illegally-seized evidence is characterized. 
Generally this rule has been interpreted as merely a rule of evidence.8 In 
support of this view, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that the admissibility of illegally-obtained evidence is largely a mat-
ter of judicial discretion9 and has also stated that without a rule of exclu-
sion the ,Fourth Amendment might as well be stricken from the Constitu-
tion.10 The implication of such statements is that the exclusionary rule is 
not embodied in the Constitution, but rather is merely designed by the 
courts to insure protection of the constitutional freedom from unreasonable 
search and seizure. The state courts which admit such evidence have empha-
sized that exclusion neither curtails the unconstitutional acts nor punishes 
the offenders, but instead aids the guilty party to the detriment of society.11 
6 E.g., Watson v. United States, (5th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 910; Williams v. United 
States, (9th Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 695; United States v. Moses, (7th Cir. 1956) 234 F. (2d) 
124, where it is said at 125 that the duty of the federal courts to enforce the Constitution 
"neither necessitates nor justifies the exclusion of evidence so obtained by state officials. 
Weeks v. United States .... " See also Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), which 
stated in dictum that the federal government could avail itself of evidence improperly 
seized solely by state officers. 
7 Principal case at 726. 
8 See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). See also Wolf v. Colorado, note 4 supra, 
concurring opinion at 39, where Justice Black stated that he agreed with the majority's 
implication that the rule is judicially created and not a command of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See also Rule 26, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 18 U.S.C. (1952). For discussions on the 
admissibility of evidence acquired through an illegal search and seizure, see 134 AL.R. 
819 (1941); comment, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1304 (1951). 
9 See Irvine v. California, note 8 supra, at 134. 
10 See Weeks v. United States, note 2 supra, at 393. Concerning other methods to 
protect a citizen from violations of his constitutional rights, see Rudd, "Present Signifi-
cance of Constitutional Guarantees Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," 18 
UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 387 (1949). For a discussion of remedies available to a citizen for 
unreasonable searches and seizures by police, see Foote, "Tort Remedies for Police Viola-
tions of Individual Rights," 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955). 
11 E.g., State ex rel. Kuhle v. Bisignano, 238 Iowa 1060, 28 N .W. (2d) 504 (1947); 
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This reasoning, however, should not cause a reversal of the principal case 
since the intended federal protection from invasions of privacy is extended 
to everyone and there has never been any indication that such protection 
is to enure only to the innocent.12 The central thesis of the Supreme Court's 
position regarding exclusion has not been that federal agents should not 
obtain the tainted evidence but, rather, that federal courts should not 
make use of it. In view of this, it would be incongruous to hold that a 
federal court must protect a citizen's constitutional right when the actions 
of a federal officer are involved but need not afford protection of the same 
right merely because a state officer was the wrongdoer. As a rule of evidence 
controlling federal courts, the rule of exclusion was thus properly applied 
in the instant case. 
The other possible basis for the inadmissibility of such evidence in the 
federal courts is that exclusion is commanded by the Fourth Amendment.13 
Before it can be determined whether the evidence in the principal case 
must be excluded on this basis, however, it is necessary to determine the 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment. The purpose of this amendment may 
be singular in that it is merely to protect a citizen from unreasonable 
search and seizure by federal officers. This purpose is effectuated, first, by 
prohibiting federal officers from engaging in the unconstitutional acts, and, 
second, if they do violate this rule, by excluding all evidence obtained as 
a result of their unlawful conduct. Thus under this view the evidence ob-
tained by state officers in the principal case through a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment need not be excluded, as the Fourth Amendment 
would have no effect on the state action. If on the other hand the purpose 
is dual-first, to prohibit federal officers from unconstitutional searches and 
Huff v. State, 82 Ga. App. 545, 61 S.E. (2d) 787 (1950). Cases which exclude evidence 
obtained ·by illegal search and seizures are State v. Hunt, (Mo. 1955) 280 S.W. (2d) 37 
and People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d) 434, 282 P. (2d) 905 (1955), which overruled previous 
decisions in California and followed the rule of exclusion on the ground that it was 
the only way to enforce the constitutional guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
For adoption of the exclusionary rule by statute, see N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §15-27; R.I. 
Gen. Laws (1956) §9-19-25; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1941) tit. 8, art. 727a. 
12 See People v. Cahan, note 11 supra, where the court stated that it is impossible to 
protect ,the rights of innocent people if the police are permitted to justify unreasonable 
searches and seizures on the ground that they assumed their victims were criminals. 
13 See WoH v. Colorado, note 4 supra, at 28, where it is said: "In Weeks ... this 
Court held that ... the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through 
an illegal search and seizure." See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Irvine 
v. California, note 8 supra, where it is stated that such "unconstitutional" evidence should 
not ,be used in state criminal proceedings. But compare the majority opinion of Justice 
Douglas in Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), allowing an injunction against a 
federal officer to prevent him from using illegally-seized evidence as the basis of testimony 
in a state court, on the ground, not of constitutional mandate, but supervisory power 
over federal officers. See generally Grant, "Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding 
Use of Illegally Seized Evidence," 15 So. CAL. L. REv. 60 (1941), where the writer 
criticizes the constitutional basis for the rule of exclusion. 
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seizures and second, to prevent federal courts from availing themselves of 
any unconstitutionally obtained evidence14-then the evidence in the prin-
cipal case acquired through a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
must be excluded. Of the two interpretations, the sounder view would 
recognize only the single purpose. Certainly it is hard to conceive that the 
Fourth Amendment is a direction toward federal courts independent of 
any acts of federal officers,15 particularly when the language of the amend-
ment specifically prohibits only the act of unreasonable search and seizure. 
It would thus appear that the exclusion of evidence in the principal 
case on the basis of a constitutional command would be quite tenuous. The 
result, which can safely be supported as a rule of evidence, nevertheless is 
sound in giving efficacy to the constitutional mandate requiring freedom 
from unreasonable search and seizure. 
Robert ]. Paley 
14 See Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Irvine v. California, note 8 supra. 
15 See Ohief Justice Warren's statement in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 at 
102, n. IO (1957), to the effect that: "It has remained an open question in this Court 
whether evidence obtained solely by state agents in an illegal search may be admissible 
in federal court despite the Fourth Amendment." Apparently Chief Justice Warren feels 
that the Fourth Amendment may not operate to preclude a federal court from availing 
itself of such evidence. His statement also seems to indicate that the Weeks case, which 
stated that such evidence is admissible, may no longer be controlling. 
